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ABSTRACT 
 
Focusing on the ‘securitisation of migration’, the first chapter explores in depth how the 
securitisation of migration in the EU and its member states has developed along the lines of 
internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state. Starting with the 1980s, 
the gradual incorporation of migration policy into the constitutional structure of the EU is 
tracked with special emphasis on the Single European Act (1986), the Schengen Convention 
(1990) and the Treaty on European Union (1992). Also, it pays particular attention to policy 
framework introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and examines developments in the 
post-Amsterdam Europe. 
 
The second chapter presents the current situation in the enlarged Union of 25 members with 
respect to free movement of workers in the light of transitional arrangements imposed upon 
the eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Articulating the experiences of 
the CEECs with respect to east-west migration, it is shown that fears in the West of an 
“influx” of eastern workers have not materialised. On the contrary, Britain, Ireland and 
Sweden, which have not excluded CEEC workers subject to the 2+3+2 scheme, have drawn 
economic benefit from their decision. Therefore, it is argued that in the face of statistical and 
factual evidence, transitional arrangements seem to be put in place for domestic political 
consumption in the context of slow-moving economies, continuing high unemployment and 
anti-immigration sentiment in the EU-15.     
 
In the final chapter, drawing from the experiences of the CEECs, yet paying due attention to 
the particularities of the Turkish case, the possible migration scenarios for Turkey are 
analysed with a view to formulate projections concerning the future of Turkey and EU 
relations with respect to labour mobility. 
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ÖZET 
 
İlk bölümde göçün güvenliğe tehdit olarak algılanmaya başlanması üzerinde durularak, 
sözkonusu olgunun AB ve üye ülkelerinde iç güvenlik, kültürel güvenlik ve refah devletinin 
karşı karşıya bulunduğu krize bağlı olarak gelişmesi ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelenmektedir. 
1980’lerden itibaren, AB’nin anayasal yapısında göç politikasına yer verilmeye başlanması, 
özellikle Tek Avrupa Senedi (1986), Schengen Sözleşmesi (1990) ve Avrupa Birliğini kuran 
Antlaşma (1992) üzerinde durularak ele alınmaktadır. Ayrıca, 1997 tarihinde imzalanan 
Amsterdam Antlaşması ile şekillenen Birliğin göç politikaları ile Amsterdam Antlaşması 
sonrasında bu alanda yaşanan gelişmelere de dikkat çekilmektedir. 
 
İkinci bölümde, 25 üye ülkeye genişleyen AB’de Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa Ülkelerine 
yönelik halihazırda uygulanmakta olan geçiş dönemi düzenlemelerine ilişkin mevcut durum 
ele alınmaktadır. Üyelik sonrası dönem incelendiğinde, Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa 
Ülkelerinden batıya korkulan göç “akını”nın gerçekleşmediği görülmektedir. Aksine, 2+3+2 
formülü uyarınca kısıtlamalara tabi tutulan üye ülke işçilerine işgücü piyasalarını açık tutan 
İngiltere, İsveç ve İrlanda’nın bu kararlarından ekonomik fayda sağladıklarına yer 
verilmektedir. Bu nedenle, mevcut istatistiki veriler ışığında, geçiş döneminin AB-15 üye 
ülkelerindeki durgun ekonomi, süregelen işsizlik ve Avrupa’da hakim olan göç karşıtı 
söylemler çerçevesinde politik kaygılarla uygulamaya koyulduğunu öne sürmek mümkündür. 
 
Son bölümde ise, Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa Ülkelerinin tecrübelerinden yola çıkılarak ve 
Türkiye’nin kendine özgü özelliklerini de göz önünde bulundurularak, işgücünün serbest 
dolaşımına ilişkin Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin geleceğine yönelik öngörülerde bulunmak üzere 
Türkiye’den AB’ye gerçekleşmesi beklenen olası göç senaryoları incelenmektedir.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the late 1980s, international migration has moved beyond raising solely humanitarian, 
labour market and societal integration concerns, and began to be viewed as a security issue at 
the national and international level alike (Lohrman, 2000:5). With the demise of the bipolar 
system after 1989, there was a shift towards non-military sources of global and regional 
security.  During Cold War, international security focused mainly on military issues such as 
the balance of power, the risk of nuclear and conventional war and the need for arms 
reduction. The passing of the bipolar world gave rise to increasing concern by the 
international community for non-military sources of instability- environmental degradation, 
rapid population growth, growing un- and under-employment and poverty, ethnic tensions, 
human rights violations, transnational terrorism and large-scale international migration (ibid).  
 
Accompanying the changes at the international level, it has been argued that security cannot 
be confined to a state-centric perspective anymore- the defence of national territory from 
external or internal aggression- but those new values that need to be protected in terms of 
security were added to the traditional ones. Not only are states supposed to defend their 
territorial integrity and political independence, but also they should protect such values as 
economic independence, cultural identity, and social stability (Aniol, 1992:13 c.f. Kicinger, 
2004:1). International migration has been identified as a non-traditional security threat among 
many others.  
 
Growing perceptions of international migration as a security issue are closely related to the 
quantitative and qualitative evolution of international migration. In 2000, there were 175 
million international migrants in the world, that is, one out of every 35 persons in the world 
was an international migrant. This total represented more than a twofold increase from 76 
million in 1960. By comparison, the world population only doubled from 3 billion in 1960 to 
6 billion in 2000. As a result, international migrants represented 2.5 and 2.9 per cent of the 
world population respectively. In early 2005 the estimated number of migrants worldwide was 
between 185 million and 192 million (IOM, 2005).  
 
Concerning the migratory flows to Europe, from the post-war period of unprecedented 
economic growth until today, three distinct structural cycles of migration into the European 
Union can be discerned (Lindstrom, 2005: 588). The first phase of European migration was 
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characterized by massive foreign labour recruitment of low-skilled workers from the southern 
periphery to benefit the war-torn economies of the north, and the second phase reunited the 
families. The third phase has been characterised by a significant increase in asylum migration, 
the east to west movement of people following the 1989 collapse of the East European 
planned economies, as well as by an increasing conflation of immigration and asylum issues. 
As a result, in 2003, there were an estimated 17 million forced migrants (asylum seekers and 
refugees) worldwide; of these 4.1 million were being hosted in Europe (UNHCR Statistical 
Yearbook, 2003 c.f. Sasse & Thielemann, 2005:657). It is further estimated that the annual net 
inflow of migrants into the EU-15 was about 1.7 million in 2002 (Sasse & Thielemann, 
2005:657), with just under 50 per cent coming from other European countries. 
 
Furthermore, with the voting down of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the 
project for greater European integration faced a major crisis. Parallel to this, the threat of 
trans-national terrorism, changing labour markets induced by global economic forces and the 
social and economic implications of demographic shifts- intensified with the accession of 10 
new member states- point to the fact that migration has become one of the most salient issues 
in European politics today and will remain a key topic in public and political debates across 
Europe. Despite the long-standing preoccupation with asylum issues, the focus has recently 
shifted to economic immigration and the integration of third-country nationals. How these 
developments will interact and influence changes at the EU level is a challenge for scholars 
and policy makers examining immigration policy both within member states and for the EU 
as a whole. 
 
The focus of the present study is to explore and attempt to explain how migration is rendered 
problematic in the security field looking at the development of securitisation of migration in 
the EU and its Member States. The case of the Netherlands is illustrative in this respect. The 
change in public and political discourse with respect to migration is manifest since the turn of 
the century in a country known for its deep-rooted multiculturalism and praised for its 
integration policies. Domestic events like the rise of Pim Fortuyn and the murder of film 
maker Theo van Gogh and international events like September 11 and Madrid and London 
bombings have contributed further to securitisation of migration. 
 
In order to examine how the European integration process is implicated in securitising 
migration, I will look into the evolution of common institutions and policies on immigration 
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while also discussing important constraints, interests, intergovernmental action and EU-level 
institutional decisions. I will then analyse the current situation in the EU-25 with respect to 
the application of transitional measures on the eight Central and East European Countries 
guided by respective research and reports. Furthermore, I will look into the experiences of old 
member states with no restrictions on the access to the labour market, namely the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, based on available reports, which provide reliable data on 
labour market trends and key findings on the post-enlargement period. Finally, I will analyse 
the possible migration scenarios for Turkey in the light of factual and statistical evidence with 
a view to formulate projections concerning the future of Turkey and EU relations with respect 
to labour mobility. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION AND EU MIGRATION POLICIES 
 
1.1 Securitisation of Migration Discourse 
 
Securitisation is the practice whereby an issue becomes a security one, not necessarily 
because of the nature or the objective importance of the threat, but because the issue is 
presented as such. Immigration is not a threat in itself but it becomes a threat for the way it is 
perceived by Western societies (invasion of national/ European identity, competition over 
jobs etc.)(Buonfino, 2004:42) Thus, instead of pinpointing immigration as one of the greatest 
security concerns of the 21st century, it is vital to acknowledge the mechanism and dynamics 
that produce immigration as a security concern. Buonfino (2004) argues that the discourse 
type of securitisation of migration has emerged in the Member States of the European Union, 
produced by the interplay of publics, media and governments with the aim of preserving 
existing power structures and socio-political boundaries.  
 
The mass media is a powerful actor, in this sense, for not only it reflects public fears about 
immigration through extensive coverage, portraying immigrants in negative terms, but the 
media messages channel and strengthen them and transform them into a powerful 
message/discourse for authorities. The securitisation discourse will then become hegemonic if 
and only if political authorities transform it into the dominant policy discourse and into actual 
political action (Buonfino, 2004:30), i.e. discursive securitisation of migration will 
preponderate over other contending discourses once public discourse transforms into policy 
discourse. As Bigo suggests, the securitisation discourse, however produces a “security 
dilemma”. The process of securitisation of migration, despite having been established with the 
perceived purpose of “reassuring” the public, will provoke and re-create fear within society. 
As a result, immigration will always be perceived as a threat (Buonfino, 2004:48). 
 
In terms of reflecting and at times manipulating public fears and insecurities, migration has 
become a meta-issue, that is, a phenomenon that can be referred to as the cause of many 
problems (Faist 1994 c.f. Huysmans 2000:762), which seems to offer an ‘explanation’ and a 
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‘justification’ for the experienced negative feelings towards the Other, namely immigrants. In 
support of this view, Greg Austin and Kate Parker (2005) lend evidence against the belief that 
anti-immigrant sentiment is based on rational concerns, such as fear about jobs. Rather the 
sentiment is more likely explained by ‘factors which have little to do with immigration as 
such’ and that the feeling is linked to other sorts of social, political or economic change’. This 
implies that these other concerns are ‘being displaced, or projected, onto the issue of 
migration’. The study suggested that ‘immigration appears to offer a particularly well-suited 
set of issues for articulating diverse problems linked to unemployment, social security, 
criminality and shared norms (Austin & Parker, 2005:29). 
 
Therefore, it is crucial to desegregate the concept of security into its economic, “societal” and 
political aspects and explore in depth what categories of security problems they pose, for 
whom and in what kind of cultural, socioeconomic and political contexts these perceptions 
arise and flourish. It is worth noting that we are dealing with perceptions here, in other words 
what we have is not tangible facts that we can measure quantitatively, but rather set of values 
and beliefs, which give rise to securitisation of migration discourse. Following Huysmans 
(2000:758), I argue that the securitisation of migration in the EU and its member states has 
developed on the basis of three relating themes: internal security, cultural security and the 
crisis of the welfare state.  
 
1.2 Internal Security, Societal Security and the Crisis of the Welfare State 
 
The interplay of different actors such as mass media, government and public opinion presents 
immigrants as a threat to public order and internal security is further reinforced through 
alleged involvements of migrants in crime such as drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, 
thefts etc. Furthermore, public debates on this issue revolve around the prejudiced portrayals 
of immigrants as prone to crime and displaying deviant behaviour which serve to justify strict 
measures towards immigration control. However,  as a research study concludes, “bias, 
disparities and disparate impact policy dilemmas are not uniquely the characteristics and 
problems of any particular minority groups or countries but are endemic to heterogeneous 
developed countries in which some groups are substantially less successfully economically 
and socially than the majority population” (Tonry, 1997 c.f. Lohrman, 2000:8). 
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A second strand of securitisation discourse treats immigrants as a threat to “societal security”. 
The concept “societal security” was developed to identify “situations when societies perceive 
a threat in identity terms”, such as the influx of immigrants or asylum seekers: “Societal 
security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing 
conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, 
within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, 
association, and religious and national identity and custom” (Weaver, 1993 c.f. Lohrman, 
2000:8). Central to this fear of being “swamped” by waves of immigrants with different 
cultural lifestyles lies the perceived threat to cultural homogeneity of the receiving state, 
which is an indispensable part of the nation-state heritage. By presenting the cultural and/or 
religious differences of the migrant communities as the reason of their failure of integration to 
the society at large, both in social and political terms, constitutes an important source for 
mobilizing security rhetoric. The different life-style and the culture of the (non-integrated) 
migrants are displayed as potentially destabilizing the social formation (Huysmans, 
2000:765). 
 
The perceived threat that the immigrants seem to form for the existing social order, is often 
connected with socio-economic concerns. Hence, migration also features prominently in the 
contemporary struggle for the welfare state. Following economic recessions and the rise in 
unemployment since 1970s, the struggle over the distribution of social goods such as housing, 
health care, unemployment benefits, jobs and other social services has become more 
competitive, which has resulted in welfare chauvinism, or the privileging of national citizens 
in the distribution of social goods (Huysmans, 2000:767). More specifically, immigrants, 
asylum seekers and refugees are increasingly seen as having no legitimate right to social 
assistance and welfare provisions. Furthermore, migration is regarded by some to pose a 
threat to social security system and the welfare state philosophy. They argue that people might 
not be willing to pay taxes if they do not feel that the others do the same and share the same 
values, which is true in case of economically inactive immigrants and asylum seekers living 
on social benefits (Kicinger, 2004:2).  
 
Andrew Geddes (2003:152) argues that it would be totally wrong to argue that migration in 
some ways drives changes in European welfare states. In fact, it is the organisational and 
ideological changes within European welfare states and the effects that these in turn have on 
understandings of migration. Moreover, when migration is the issue, the public and political 
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discourse clearly distinguishes between ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ migrants. What makes a 
migrant wanted in the Community or by the same token unwanted? The answer lies in the 
perceived contribution of a particular migrant or group of migrants to the economy or 
conversely potential adverse effects it is likely to have on the welfare state in question. 
Closely related to this is the ‘gap hypothesis’ formulated by Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 
(c.f. Geddes, 2003:155), which points to the disparity between the rhetoric of control and the 
reality of continued immigration. Although there have been welfare-state-related arguments 
behind restrictive policies, there are also those who hold the opinion that some welfare-related 
openness is necessary concerning some forms of migration that contribute to these welfare 
states filling gaps in certain sectors and protecting against ageing Europe from longer-term 
demographic pressures.  
 
Geddes (2003:158) provides the example of England, where for the first time in more than 
thirty years the UK has even allowed labour migrants to enter the UK without a job and has 
vastly expanded the reach of the mechanism which allows employers to attract skilled 
migrants to fill vacancies in sectors such as IT and engineering on renewable permits with 
permanent residence possible after four years. Conversely, Tomas Hammar (c.f Geddes, 
2003:160) has detected a strong welfare component in the drive to tighten controls on 
immigration in Scandinavian countries, as these states see to close the migration door to their 
welfare states. In Denmark, for example, a seven – year qualification period has been 
introduced for the immigrant newcomers before full access to welfare state entitlements can 
be gained.  
 
1.3 Post 9/11 
 
Increasing global interconnectedness combined with post-9/11 security concerns have 
rendered the phenomenon of movement of people an even more politically sensitive and 
challenging issue for national governments to manage. Since 9/11, the growing suspicion 
towards migrants has increased, rising public fears of immigration have been exploited by the 
media and politicians who claim to voice public concerns coupled with increasingly 
restrictive policies employed by nation-states. The case of the Netherlands is illustrative in 
that respect.  
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The rise of Pim Fortuyn associated with right-wing populism and viewed as to belong to the 
same political family as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider, Silvio Berlusconi et. al. was a 
phenomenon that caught everyone by surprise in the Netherlands and in all of Europe.1 He 
argued that the Netherlands was a “full country” and Islam a “backward culture” and it would 
be better to abolish “that weird article of the constitution: thou shalt not discriminate” (Prins, 
2002:376). Furthermore, he insisted on the preservation of national sovereignty against the 
ever increasing influence of the European Union and he warned about “Islamization” of 
Dutch society. And his warnings became not so controversial after September 11 attacks. 
There was more support for Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands due to fear of political Islam and 
Muslim fundamentalism.  
 
Though the Netherlands has been welcoming immigrants hospitably for centuries, there was 
growing resistance among the Dutch public since the turn of the century. And whereas before 
mutual acceptance and respect for different cultures was encouraged and affirmed and 
political correctness was the norm, the boundaries of multicultural society began to be 
publicly discussed. In such an environment where “immigrant bashing” was rising, it is no 
surprise that Pim Fortuyn’s harsh rhetoric “The borders must be closed, we are fiddling whilst 
Rome burns” and pro-assimilationist standpoint “adapt or leave” was embraced. It is 
interesting to note that political parties in the Netherlands had until 2002 refrained from 
interpolating the ‘foreigners’ issue into electoral politics. That is, until Pim Fortuyn arrived on 
the scene and spoke the things that were in people’s minds but were not outspoken (Van 
Holsteyn & Irwin, 203:62). Some people truly welcomed him as the “real leader”. The LPF 
(List Pim Fortuyn) came out of the 15 May 2002 elections as the second largest party going 
straight into government, which displayed how successful Pim Fortuyn had been in appealing 
to the electorate who cast their vote on “foreigners should adapt”. However, his assassination 
by an environmentalist just before the elections shook his party deeply and soon after the 
party was caught in internal strife and thus the coalition collapsed only after 87 days in office.       
 
Nevertheless, the political environment seemed to have changed for the worst. The current 
developments employed by the government signal the most restrictive decisions taken so far 
concerning both the newcomers and legal migrant residents. People migrating voluntarily to 
                                                 
1 Pim Fortuyn was a controversial politician in the Netherlands due to his views on Islam and his anti-
immigration stance, who formed his own party List Pim Fortuyn (or LPF). LPF became the second largest party 
in the general election results of 15 May 2002 going straight  into government with CDA (Christian Democrats) 
and VVD (Conservative Liberals).  
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the Netherlands have to learn minimum 500 words of Dutch before arrival and pass exams 
geared towards testing their integration before being granted a residence permit. Furthermore, 
the scope of this scheme has been extended as to apply to legal migrant residents who have 
settled in the Netherlands before 1998 and who are under 57,5 of age. 
 
2. Immigration Policies of the EU 
 
Individual national migration policies of the member states of the Union, i.e. speaking of EU-
15, vary considerably as the history of those countries suggests. Furthermore, formulation of 
migration policy is highly politically sensitive owing to the fact that not only it goes to the 
heart of their history, but also mingles with their economic development, and notions of 
national identity, sovereignty and autonomy inducing profound implications for the country in 
question. Nonetheless, a gradual but steady process of EU cooperation has taken place since 
the 1980s starting first on freedom of movement of EU citizens within the EU borders and 
then in relation to non-EU citizens on issues of immigration and asylum.  
 
I will set out to outline the historical development of EU cooperation with respect to 
migration policies driven by different incentives, concerns, tradeoffs between member states 
and the EU that had policy implications for common policy-making.  
 
2.1 The First Phase of EU Migration Policy (1985-1991) 
 
Demarcating the lines of development of a European immigration policy: The first phase 
(1985-91) corresponds to ad-hoc and informal cooperation of the national governments in 
immigration matters, where sovereign power rested solely with member states. 
 
2.1.1 Schengen Agreement 
 
Period of intergovernmental activity within Europe began with secretive meetings of interior 
ministers and senior civil servants in the early 1980s, where discussions of justice and home 
affairs matters took place in the ‘Trevi Group’. In 1985 France, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Schengen Agreement to remove controls at their 
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internal borders, which necessitated tightening security measures at the common external 
border. As such started took off the process of formulating common policies on asylum, visas 
and police cooperation. Signing of Schengen Convention in 1990, their commitment was 
implemented. However, it was not until 1995 Schengen Treaty, when internal controls were 
finally abolished between the five Schengen participants and Portugal and Spain.  
 
2.1.2 Single European Act (SEA) 
 
The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) marked a deepening of the existing “common market” 
created in 1968 through the creation of the single market defined by Article 8 A of the Treaty 
as an area without internal frontiers within which the free movement of people, services, 
goods and capital will be assured. Important to note that this not only deepened negative 
integration i.e. removal of barriers to trade, but also raised the issue of “positive” integration, 
new structures to deal with immigration issues. However, the envisaged free movement of 
persons who are nationals of an EU member state does not necessarily bring with it common 
immigration policies as some kind of inevitable spill-over effect (Geddes, 2001:24). While 
member states are willing to give up some sovereignty to pursue economic integration, they 
are not so eager when it comes to politically charged sensitive issues such as migration.           
Political sensitivity of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA from here on) and member states’ 
reluctance to relax their firm grip on national issues in delegating power to the  EU have 
further complicated the EU decision-making process and constituted a major obstacle in the 
way of devising common immigration policies.  
 
2.2 The Second Phase of EU Migration Policy (1992-1998) 
 
The second phase (1992-1998) introduced by the Maastricht Treaty is characterized by a form 
of ‘diluted’ intergovernmentalism; although migration-related issues were regarded as 
common interest and institutional links with the other Community institutions were 
established, it gave leading actor status to national governments (Kostakopoulou, 2000:498). 
During this period, failing to address the challenge of immigration by formulating a 
comprehensive policy, national executives tended to rely on past domestic experiences and 
national restrictive laws and problematizing immigration was to their benefit for electoral 
success. 
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2.2.1 Maastricht Treaty  
 
With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU created its structure of three pillars2. JHA was 
given its own third pillar within a securitized policy frame under “Police and Judicial 
Cooperation” alongside with the common foreign and security policy as the second pillar 
while the first pillar sought to consolidate the European Economic Area via supranational 
cooperation. The JHA pillar brought aspects of immigration policy under the EU’s roof, but 
as matters of common interest and not as subjects for a “common policy” (Geddes, 2001:25). 
Seeking to address the weaknesses of informality predominant in the 1980s, Maastricht Treaty 
placed the Council as the focus for decision-making with intergovernmentalism as the rule at 
the expense o f the Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice. Apart 
from intergovernmental cooperation and use of non-binding instruments, post-Maastricht 
policies are criticized for the emphasis placed on the “lowest common denominator” (Geddes, 
2000 c.f. Linsdtrom, 2005:589), which fall far from generating efficient solutions to problems 
while security-oriented way of understanding migration developed and was sustained.        
 
In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as of supreme priority. An agent 
claims the need and right to treat such an issue by extraordinary means (Weiner, 1995 c.f. 
Lindstrom, 2005:591). “Employing a security discourse fails to deal with asylum and 
immigration as a matter of normal politics by moving the issue into the realm of discretionary 
high politics” (ibid) and profoundly restricts policy options. Furthermore, this poses 
challenges of implementation: welfare and internal security concerns remain nationalized, 
whereas migration issues increasingly call for action at the EU-level. Furthermore, as Moraes 
(2003:120) points out controversial packaging of migration issues with the other JHA issues 
of cross-border crime and policing contribute to securitisation of migration since this has the 
political effect of associating migration with negative security issues, while excluding 
discussion of its positive economic and cultural benefits.  
 
Accompanying the changes in political and economic landscape of the EU, as the European 
post-war economic boom came to an end and the four freedoms of movement stipulated in 
                                                 
2 From here on,  pillarization in the context of the evolution of EU immigration policies refers to the EU 
structure of three pillars established by the Maastricht Treaty (1992). The Maastricht Treaty sought to resolve 
some of the weaknesses of informality by placing immigration within an intergovernmental pillar dealing with 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). This pillar was also known as the third pillar. The central pillar was the 
Community and the second pillar Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
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Rome Treaty –goods, services, capital and persons- began to be realized, immigrants came to 
be perceived as a threat to the national economy, the welfare state and the social order of the 
host country. Consequently, Lindstrom (2005: 589) argues a fundamentally exclusive and 
defensive approach to European security has been prominent since the mid-1980s, as 
embodied in partly overlapping intergovernmental cooperative frameworks (Trevi, Schengen, 
Maastricht’s third pillar on Police and Judicial Cooperation). Such frameworks constituted a 
“very peculiar, homogenous and cohesive ‘internal security regime’” (ibid). 
 
The 1998 Vienna Action Plan further reveals the securitized line of thinking on matters of 
asylum and immigration (Lindstrom, 2005:590). The Austrian Presidency, then, envisaged an 
EU migration regime based on a model of concentric circles according to which the EU 
represents the inner circle; neighbours more or less in line with the EU’s migration standards 
represent the second circle. Third circle, where Turkey is located along with Commonwealth 
of Independent States and North Africa would be treated as buffer zones and encouraged to 
cooperate with the Union regarding transit checks and such measures having the same effect 
of diverting population flows before entering the EU territory. Finally, the fourth circle 
(Middle East, China, sub-Saharan Africa and Horn of Africa) involves countries that would 
receive financial assistance to eradicate the push factors for migration. 
  
As Lindstrom (2005) argues strategies of control and diversion predominate both in EU 
migration and internal security regimes, namely the objective of reducing threats to security 
and stability have been sought through preventing and diverting population movement into 
the EU. Put differently, the metaphor “Fortress Europe” that is often associated with EU 
migration policy and literally meaning external exclusion based on tight border controls and 
internal exclusion based on the social marginalization of immigrant newcomers was replaced 
by a model of “concentric circles”. Both derive their power from the fear of large-scale 
uncontrolled migration and the negative impact of migration on European people successfully 
framed in security discourse.       
 
2.3 The Third Phase of EU Migration Policy 
 
This phase is characterized by a shift from “pillarization” established by Maastricht Treaty to 
“communitarization” by Amsterdam Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty marked an important step 
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in the development of immigration and asylum policy, which implies both a greater role for 
EU institutions in decision-making and the use of traditional EC legal instruments, such as 
directives and regulations. Immigration and asylum now reside with free movement in Title 
IV of the EU.     
 
2.3.1 Amsterdam Treaty 
 
The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 provided for the establishment of an 
“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. As agreed, most of JHA, including visa, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons, were moved into the 
Title IV of the first pillar while judicial cooperation in criminal matters and policing remained 
in the third. The Schengen acquis was also incorporated into the EU law some parts placed in 
the Title IV and some in the JHA pillar.  
 
Kostakopolou (2000) draws attention to two parallel trends in pre-Amsterdam Europe and 
point to an inconsistency in EU migration policy, i.e. liberalization ethos versus securitisation 
ethos. In this view, policy towards intra-EU migration has been increasingly liberal and 
expansionist, whereas the extra-EU migration policy has become increasingly controlled and 
restrictive. The resulting paradox is that despite considerable steps undertaken at the EU level 
to facilitate the free movement of workers and tighter immigration policies towards third 
countries since the middle of the 1970s, there is a surprisingly low level of intra-EU level 
mobility for employment purposes by EU citizens, while mobility of non-EU nationals into 
and within the EU labour market are on the rise (Carrera & Formisano, 2005:5).  
 
Intergovernmentalism as a form of cooperation was criticized heavily for failing to correct 
inconsistencies in the EU migration policy. In this respect, the Amsterdam Treaty’s 
“communitarization” of immigration is important because it meant that aspects of 
immigration policy were moved closer to normal EU decision-making processes, thus 
providing a role for the Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice. 
However, this was a “cautious communitarization” (Geddes, 2001:25). Despite JHA issues 
were placed at the centre of EU decision-making, member states consolidated the 
intergovernmental element in the process. The Council would decide on the basis of 
unanimity until at least 2004, the Commission would share its powers of proposal with the 
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member states, while the European Court of Justice would only be able to act on the basis of a 
referral from the highest courts in the member states.  
 
Furthermore, the instances of differentiated integration found in the new Title- the opt-out 
protocols negotiated by Britain, Ireland and Denmark and the Schengen Protocol- lend further 
evidence in support of integovernmentalism (Kostakopoulou, 2000:501). With respect to the 
incorporation of the Schengen acquis into EC law, the acquis is not binding on the UK and 
Ireland, but these states may decide to take part in the provisions which make up the acquis 
(ibid). The UK and Ireland do participate in some aspects of Schengen, including the 
Schengen Information System. Apart from rules on visas, similar provisions apply to 
Denmark which has resisted any possibility of opting in during or after decision- making in 
the Council. And although neither Norway nor Iceland is a member of the EU, both joined the 
Schengen area in 1996 and signed an agreement with EU in 1999 to continue their 
participation in the Schengen area. Moreover, immigration policy and measures concerning 
the rights of long-term resident third country nationals do not fall within the Community’s 
exclusive competence, member states are allowed to maintain or introduce national 
provisions. 
 
Some argue (e.g. Lindstrom, 2005:591), the decision-making processes set up by the 
Amsterdam Treaty continued to allow for the “worst practices” of individual states to be 
transposed into both EU legislation and framework decisions, in a way allowing for their 
export to other EU member states with the effect of rescuing the European nation states. Yet, 
some others like Geddes (2001) see the EU as a potential corrective to lowest-common-
denominator intergovernmental decision-making and refutes the view that regards EU as an 
external venue to which member states escape, but considers the extent to which EU 
competencies feeds back into domestic contexts in a deeper and increasingly wider EU.    
 
In an attempt to explain the shift from informal and intergovernmentally-based cooperation to 
a more Community-based form of integration, Geddes (2001) contrasts two schools of 
thought: “Losing control” thesis links the development of EU immigration policy to economic 
integration and the creation of single market, which have consolidated forms of free 
movement and mobility that fundamentally challenge the state-centric logic relating to the 
movement of people. Differently, “escape to Europe” thesis focuses on the ways in which 
states have sought new venues that allow them to attain their domestic policy objectives 
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without facing the kinds of legal and political constraints that they encountered at national 
level (Geddes, 2001:28). This form of cooperation is likely to be intergovernmental with some 
tendencies towards “lowest common denominator” restrictive policies.  
 
Geddes contends that the shift from “pillarization” to “communitarization” does not 
necessarily mean that states have “lost control”, rather they are seeking to reassert control 
over forms of migration that their policies define as unwanted. Following the same line of 
reasoning, Kostakopoulou (2000) argues that with the structural shift in pillars, the Members 
States could also use the new institutional and procedural framework to extend the forms of 
social control, strengthen their regulatory capacities, and reinforce the culturally constructed 
representation of immigration as  both a ‘problem’ and a ‘law and order’ issue. She points out 
that still more worrying is permeation of the securitisation ethos which characterized the 
framework of intergovernmental co-operation into the Community concept of an ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice’ (Kostakopoulou, 2000:505). Put bluntly, the EU offers its 
member states a manoeuvre ground, where they are able to implement their state-centric 
objectives while they can also claim to remain committed to universal rights. 
 
Kostakopoulou (2000:57) also underlines that the concept of security underpinning the notion 
of an area of freedom, security and justice refers to measures designed to ensure that the 
citizens of Europe are free from risk or danger and from anxiety or fear. Here it is neither the 
order of the state nor “societal security” that is at stake, rather the Community worries about 
Union citizens who are seen as vulnerable to threats and thus in need of security. Adopting 
Member States’ own discourse on the ‘securitisation’ of migration, the Community inherits 
from the Member States the tendency to treat security threats and vulnerability as independent 
realities which are not subject to verification and to critical inquiry (ibid) and overlooks the 
societal and political dynamics that generate such discourses.  
 
Consequently, the structural shift from the intergovernmental pattern of cooperation to the 
Community framework has not been accompanied by a cognitive shift which challenges the 
securitisation of migration, rather it has opened the way for installation of the logic of 
exclusion and the security paradigm which characterized the Third Pillar within the system of 
Community law (Kostakopoulou, 2000:499).  
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2.3.2 Tampere Summit 
 
As EU cooperation in the field of migration became formalized, calls began to be heard for a 
more comprehensive immigration policy taking into account the root causes of migration into 
the EU as well as the immigration needs of the EU itself. The milestone in this respect was the 
Tampere European Council meeting in October 1999, where it was agreed that ‘the separate 
but closely related issues of asylum and migration call for a common EU policy’. Tampere is 
important because it was the first time the Council has been explicit both in calling for the EU 
to work formally towards a binding common EU policy and in setting out a blueprint for a 
common policy which could be described as comprehensive (Moraes, 2003:120).  
 
The agenda of the Tampere Council meeting consisted of critical issues like the management 
of immigration policy, along with the integration of third country nationals and the need to 
address the causes and push factors of migration, leading to partnerships with source 
countries. In its Conclusions, the European Commission stated expressly that “from an 
analysis of the economic and demographic context of the Union and of the countries of origin 
… zero immigration policies of the last thirty years are no longer appropriate.” The 
Commission emphasized that Europe stood at a crossroads concerning its immigration policy: 
Either it could continue to resist migratory pressures or accept that immigration will continue 
and work towards maximizing its positive effects on the Union of the migrant themselves and 
for the countries of origin (Moraes, 2003:125). At Tampere, it seemed consensus was 
established between institutions of the Union- the Commission, Council and the Parliament- 
to take action towards balanced and comprehensive immigration policy. The Tampere 
Commitment was reaffirmed at the Laeken Council in December 2002, however this could 
not be sustained for there was a shift in emphasis of the agenda in favour of ‘illegal 
immigration’ at Seville Council Meeting 2002.  
 
2.3.3 Hague Programme 
 
The second multi-annual programme dealing with freedom, security and justice, the Hague 
Programme, sets out the objective for the development of an AFSJ for the next five years, is 
less pioneering and innovative than its predecessor agreed at Tampere. The Council now 
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emphasises that the actual determination of volumes for the admission of labour migrants 
remains an exclusive competence of the member states, and calls on the Commission “to 
present a policy plan on legal migration including admission procedures capable of 
responding promptly to fluctuating demands for migrant labour in the labour market before 
the end of 2005” (Carrera & Formisano, 2005:4). The authors argue that if the Council had 
adopted a more ambitious programme concerning the field of regular migration, it would have 
represented a real push towards the strengthening of freedom and justice in an enlarging EU.  
 
In order to establish an area of freedom, security and justice in its true meaning and to tackle 
European social fears and insecurities with respect to migration  fuelled by political and 
media discourses, EU needs to advocate a “security and equality approach” (Carrera & 
Formisano,2005:10) and should place main emphasis on securing rights rather than security.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
FIFTH WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT- FEARS FULFILLED? 
 
The fifth wave of enlargement resulting in the accession of 10 new member states- Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Cyprus- into 
the Union has raised many questions with respect to the future of the EU integration process. 
Specifically, the spotlight has been on migration and the debates have mostly centred on the 
question of the much feared large-scale East-West migration. Aware of the economic and 
opportunity differences between new and old Member States and sensing their electorates’ 
anti-immigration attitude, governments of the EU-15 have opted to impose measures to 
protect their labour markets and welfare systems from Central and Eastern European 
Countries’ citizens. 
 
2.1 Transitional Arrangements 
 
Based on concerns in the old Member States, the European Commission, in its accession 
agreements with eight of the ten new Member States -with the exception of Malta and 
Cyprus3 where the general rules of free movement apply- established a transitional mobility 
regime potentially restricting access to EU-15 labour markets (van Selm & Tsolakis, 2004). 
This implies that the access to employment and welfare benefits for the citizens of eight of the 
ten new member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia) will be restricted by the EU-15 countries. Only the UK, 
Ireland and Sweden chose not to impose any restrictions for the newcomers. The other EU-15 
countries maintained a work permit regime, sometimes combined with quotas. Poland, 
Slovenia and Hungary in return invoked reciprocity against EU-15 Member States applying 
restrictions.            
 
Free movement of workers, which enables nationals of any Member State to work in another 
Member State under the same conditions as nationals of that state, is one of the four 
                                                 
3 That is due to their small size and relative economic strength. In addition, Malta has been granted the right to 
impose safeguards if it witnesses a considerable influx of workers from other EU Member States to its labour 
market.  
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fundamental freedoms provided for in the EC Treaty. However, the Accession Treaty signed 
on 16 April 2003 between the EU-15 Member States and the EU-10 lays down transitional 
arrangements concerning the free movement of workers within the enlarged Union. Paragraph 
3 (2) of the transitional arrangements on freedom of movement for persons annexed to the 
Treaty of Accession of 2003 stipulates that the introduction of part of Community law on free 
movement of workers may be deferred for a maximum period of 7 years4 according to the “2 
plus 3 plus 2” formula. The first phase of the transitional arrangements started on 1 May 2004 
and ends on 30 April 2006. The Accession Treaty states that before the end of this phase, the 
Council shall review the functioning of the transitional arrangements on the basis of a 
Commission report. The restrictions can only be applied to migrant workers concerning only 
obtaining access to the labour market and can only limit eligibility for employment in a 
particular Member State. 
 
2.2 East-West Migration since 1990s within the Context of Labour 
Migration Trends 
 
First of all, it should be emphasized that all European states are now net immigration 
countries. For more established host countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom 
(UK), Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, this has been the case 
since at least the 1960s. Despite a decline in migration after recruitment stops in 1973-4, 
immigration flows have been continuous, for the most part taking the form of family reunion, 
refugee flows and labour migration. Most have experienced particularly high levels of 
immigration since the 1990s. Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK 
and Nordic countries are all examples of this trend. A notable exception is Germany, which 
has seen a decrease in flows since the early 1990s, although this can be attributed to the 
exceptionally high levels of influx in the early 1990s.5   
 
The accession of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs from hereon) into the 
Union and the feared east-west migration as a consequence of enlargement is historically 
                                                 
4 COM (2006), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Report on the Functioning of the 
Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006) 
5 www.gcim.org  Migration in Europe, A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the 
Global Commission on International Migration, by Christina Boswell Migration Research Group Hamburg 
Institute of  International Economics, September 2005.    
 26 
 
ironic. During the second half of the twentieth century, the most obvious, and 
uncompromising form of migration control was the Iron Curtain, which made it unthinkable 
to travel from East to West Europe for forty years leading to isolation of European 
Community’s member states from possible East-West migration (Favell & Hansen, 
2002:584). 
 
With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the EU-12 feared a massive influx from the newly 
liberated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and in 1990 some 300,000 people actually 
made that move (van Selm & Tsolakis, 2004:4) But then the number quickly dropped. Since 
the mid-1990s, an estimated 50,000 people have moved annually from the ten Central and 
Eastern European Countries including also Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. By 2002, about 
1 million people from those ten countries were living in the EU, about 700,000 of which are 
from the eight countries that joined the EU on May 1(ibid).  
 
Especially, Austria and Germany saw a two-fold migration opportunity after 1989. Permitting 
controlled labour migration would allow both countries to channel the migration pressures 
emerging after the fall of the Iron Curtain and it would fulfil the shortage of labour in low-
wage jobs, such as construction in Germany and tourism and gastronomy in Austria (Favell & 
Hansen, 2002:590). Following unification, there was especially sharp increase in demand for 
labour in Germany and Germany’s Christian Democrat / Christian Socialist coalition 
government responded by negotiating new bilateral accords with CEECs and Turkey. It is no 
exaggeration to say that following unification, Germany’s new capital would not have been 
rebuilt without unskilled migrant labour (ibid.)       
  
Also, from the mid-1990s onwards, German, British and other European governments have 
begun to search for ways to attract skilled migrants. The need to recruit skilled labour came 
with the realization that Europe has to achieve growth and productivity and strengthen its 
competitiveness in the global market vis a vis US and Japan and the best way to address this 
problem was to fulfil the labour shortages faced by major European economies most notably 
in the IT sector that required high-skilled migrants. The liberal US immigration policy on H1 
visas for highly-skilled workers was an inspiration for Germany’s first attempt in issuing 
20,000 visas for high-skilled, high-wage jobs, launching the so-called ‘Green Card’ visa 
programme despite its five-year contractual limit (Favell & Hansen,2002:591).  
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Since the 1990s, the migration trend in the case of Central and Eastern European Countries 
has been temporary migration, which does not have burdensome consequences on the welfare 
state. The great majority of Poles, Czechs and Hungarians who consider migrating, they 
perceive it as a supplement to not replacement of their home-country earnings (Jileva, 
2002:690). As the results of a May 2001 survey reveals 70 per cent of the Polish respondents 
wanted to work abroad for periods ranging between two months to two years, or to work in 
the EU at regular intervals but continue living in their home country. Twelve per cent of them 
intended to work for longer than two years and 13 per cent to settle permanently (ibid). 
 
Another striking trend in the second half of the 1990s is that as CEECs became more 
prosperous, the incentive to move has declined and they have started attracting migrants 
themselves. A study conducted by the European Integration Consortium at the request of the 
Employment and Social Affairs Directorate General of the European Commission on the 
impact of eastern enlargement on employment and wages in the EU concludes that one should 
not fear massive immigration. The study makes the projection that the number of foreign 
residents from the CEECs in the EU would increase annually by around 335,000 immediately 
after the introduction of free movement of persons and within a decade this figure will fall to 
below 150,000 people (Jileva, 2002:690). 
 
Restrictions concerning freedom of movement for workers are not brought up for the first 
time in the context of eastern enlargement. It was a controversial issue placed high on the 
agenda during the accession negotiation talks with Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s, 
which resulted in transition periods for the mobility of labour. Although Greece acceded to 
the EC in 1981, only after 1986 was it labour force allowed to move freely and Spain and 
Portugal entered the EC in 1986 with restrictions on labour movement until 1992. At that 
point, however, the concept of European Citizenship, established in the 1992 Treaty on 
European Union and the rights attached to it, one of which is the right to move to, reside and 
take up employment in all Member States, was not in place (van Selm & Tsolakis, 
2004:4).Thus, as the Union enlarged on May 1, 2004, the citizens of CEECs entered it as 
‘second-class EU citizens’. They were granted the right to move and reside across the EU, but 
barred from being able to take up employment freely in all Member States except Ireland, 
Sweden and the UK. 
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These temporary yet fundamental restrictions represent a significant barrier to the free 
movement rights to be effectively and freely exercised by all the new EU citizens ( with the 
exception of Malta and Cyprus).Throughout the time transitional arrangements will be 
implemented, some of the provisions that lie at the very heart of the EU integration process 
and that provide an essential level of protection for workers (such( as Arts. 39 and 49.1 of the 
EC Treaty), will not apply to the citizens of these states. Any national from the acceding 
countries who may hence wish to enter an old EU member state, or to move from one EU 
country to another for labour purposes, will not have the right to take up any available pay 
employment in the territory of another old member state “with the same priority as nationals 
of the State” as established by Art.1 of Council Regulation 1612/68, on the freedom of 
movement of workers within the Community (Turmann & Carrera, 2004).    
 
Having said this, the effect the fifth wave of enlargement will have on migratory trends, many 
analysts, conclude, is likely to be similar to that of two previous EU enlargements, namely to 
that of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Those enlargements prompted only 
small-scale emigration from the new Member States despite economic differences that 
resemble the current situation between the EU-15 and the EU-8. In the cases of Greece, Spain 
and Portugal, migration continued to be negligible even after the end of transition periods that 
restricted freedom of employment for their citizens. Many of those who did emigrate returned 
to their country of origin after some years, when economic opportunities back home became 
competitive with those available elsewhere in the EU (van Selm & Tsolakis, 2004:4). 
 
The Southern enlargement experience, which also witnessed the exclusion of citizens of new 
member states from labour mobility, reveals that transitional periods were applied then for 
basically the same reason- EU member states fearing influxes of migrant workers rather than 
to a real threat of migration. This is in line with Commission stating in 2000 that “fears that 
mass migration would ‘flood’ the labour markets of present states do not seem justified also in 
the light of experience from previous enlargements which would suggest the migration flows 
are affected by economic conditions and prospects, more than by the right of free movement” 
(Jileva,2002:691). Besides, EU membership is likely to create prospects for the new member 
state nationals to search for jobs in their home countries as economic conditions improve and 
hence act as a migration deterrent and might even facilitate return migration.   
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Favell and Hansen (2002) argue that the key to understanding emerging migration trends 
across Europe lies in acknowledging how a new international labour market responds to 
demand. The authors articulate the international labour market responds by actively recruiting 
high and low-skilled migrant labour, both non-European and intra-European notwithstanding 
restrictive measures imposed by national governments to curb unwanted migration. To 
illustrate their point, they give the example of European governments led by Germany and 
Britain, the most-acclaimed zero-immigration countries in Europe, to return to migration as a 
means of addressing economic and demographic problems at the end of 1990s (Favell and 
Hansen, 2002:582). 
 
According to Favell and Hansen (2002:585), economic integration dictates that states must 
give up the discretion they once claimed to designate who is and is not a legitimate resident of 
their territory, and rather allow market sources to dictate supply and demand of migrant 
labour across economically interdependent territories. They argue that free movement acts as 
a market correction for asymmetric shocks and imbalances to the system and when 
inequalities are reduced through the equilibrium mechanism across the continent, the 
incentive to move declines and migration becomes controlled, through a market-based rather 
than a state-enforced mechanism. In this view, the market-based reasoning for integration 
challenges the nation-state-centred conceptions of immigration, hence migration flows is 
determined by market dynamics and not by politics. 
 
Migration in Europe beginning to resemble more the scenario of labour market theorists, who 
point to self-regulating supply and demand factors as the ultimate determinants of labour 
mobility, clash with nation-states continued will to retain discretion over migration flows 
through “politicising” migration. From an economic point of view, the principle of free 
movement of persons helps to achieve equality of opportunity within the EU by abolishing 
obstacles to the mobility of factors of production and whether they become employed or not 
crucially depends on the labour market situation in the particular member state. However, in 
wider political terms, the tolerance of the principle of free labour movement is an important 
signal of a willingness to treat the citizens of one EU member state as welcome within any 
other (Jileva, 2002:689).  
 
In this respect, not only do the transitional arrangements go against the founding idea of the 
European Communities, i.e. to unite people and not only economies, it is at odds with the 
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current economic and demographic situation in Europe which lend support in favour of 
opening up western labour market to Central-and Eastern European markets. It is documented 
that immigrant labour, temporary or permanent, can help to alleviate bottlenecks in the labour 
market of the recipient countries’ and contribute to lower wage inflation. Furthermore, birth 
rates have declined across Europe substantially following the post-World War II baby boom 
and ageing of population has become significant. Considering the demographic situation in 
the EU and skills shortages in various sectors, the EU is unable to resolve its problems from 
within since the intra-EU mobility of workers is very low. (Favell&Hansen, 2002:592). 
Therefore, immigration can be an effective remedy for demographic deficit facing all 
European countries rendering the depopulation process less difficult, and can affect the age 
structure in a manner that might cushion social programmes under pressure through an ageing 
population (ibid). 
 
The main impetus for European integration coming from market-driven concerns and despite 
sound economic basis in favour of labour mobility –such as the need of industry for low-
skilled labour and the skills shortages for high-skilled labour coupled with demographic 
deficit, how can we account for the restrictions imposed upon new member states?        
 
2.3 Internal Versus External Migration in the EU 
 
In the accession negotiations, Germany and Austria were the two countries that were most 
persistent on the introduction of transitional periods for free movement of workers after 
accession. German Chancellor Schroeder argued that free movement of people could not be 
accommodated by the German labour market from one day to the next. He argued that as of 
the year 2010, Germany would be increasingly in need of foreign labour for demographic 
reasons, but until then transitions had to be applied. In December 2000, Schroeder proposed a 
plan for the enlargement negotiations calling for a transitional period of seven years in which 
freedom of movement on labour markets would be restricted. And also German trade unions 
lobbied hard for workers coming from the east to be kept out, fearing that newcomers would 
force down wages and induce unemployment (Jileva, 2002:694). In Austria, more radically 
the Freedom Party called for enlargement to be delayed by ten years and Jörg Haider 
suggested in February 2000 that enlargement should take place only when wage levels in the 
CEE countries are at Austrian levels (ibid).  
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The negative stance adopted by Germany and Austria on extending labour mobility to CEECs 
is to a large extent dictated by populist fears. Popular fears of mass migration in Germany and 
Austria arise from large migration waves experienced in the 1990s. These waves were the 
result of war refugees from disintegrating Yugoslavia coming to Germany and Austria which 
had heavily recruited Yugoslav labour migrants during the economic miracle. However, the 
current political and economic situation in CEECs does not resemble the situation then. And 
also different is the open borders which permit easy return facilitating temporary migration. 
According to analysts, employment restrictions have little impact on actual migration from the 
new Member States, but they answer domestic political concerns in the context of slowing 
economies, high unemployment and anti-immigration sentiments (ECAS, 2005:28). Polish 
negotiator Jan Truszczynski has stressed that ‘indeed, while accepting the transitional 
mechanism as it now stands, we still underline our view that there is no sufficient economic 
basis, nor demographic basis, for having an arrangement of that nature’ (Jileva, 2002:696). 
 
George Menz argues that the central focus of the European integration lies in constructing a 
Single Market and although the process of European integration has changed since the 
implementation of the Single European Act in 1986, the fundamental ambition has remained 
economically driven. Measures in other policy areas, such as immigration and social policy, 
are accompanying and enhancing, but never obstructing or derailing the process of market-
building (Menz, 2002:723). 
 
Proposing an analytical framework for the analysis of EU labour immigration policy, Menz 
distinguishes between internal and external immigration. Within the framework of the flow 
impetus in EU immigration policy, European Union-driven liberalization and attempts to 
create a Single Market lead to internal (labour) migration which may then be re-regulated by 
member states at the national level. By contrast, the EU’s external immigration policy is 
conditioned by national-level initiatives that ‘osmose’ from bottom to top. At the national 
level such initiatives may emerge through political engineering of the immigration theme, 
propelled for instance through rapidly rising de facto levels of migration or by the political 
‘marketing’ of the issue by far-right xenophobe parties. (Menz, 2002:724). Menz argues that 
the EU encourages internal migration as part of its market-building efforts, and Commission 
and the Court of Justice tolerate national regulatory responses so long as they do not obstruct 
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the underlying principles of the Single Market and in the case of external immigration, 
national and bilateral agreements and initiatives eventually shape the European level.                 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, internal labour mobility basically consisted of migration from Italy to 
France and Germany until the late 1980s and concerning external labour migration member 
states concluded bilateral agreements with third countries to fill in their cheap labour 
shortages. Later the fall of the Iron Curtain made it possible for CEECs to enter the EU 
member states. It is striking that notwithstanding German-Polish border becoming the world’s 
sharpest division line in terms of wage differentials, the German government data reveals 
immigration from Poland reached its peak in 1989 and declined since then (Menz, 2002:726). 
In the late 1990s, national initiatives were launched to allow for the temporary employment of 
seasonal workers from third countries and bilateral contracts were signed with CEECs. The 
perceived need for such workers was voiced and popularized by the business community of 
Austria and Germany, presented as an imperative for the country itself in order to maintain 
international competitiveness (ibid). 
 
With respect to external immigration, the governments of the member states are in favour of 
re-inventing the guest-worker concept. They permit the sector-specific import of labour either 
in instances in which it seems impossible-at least temporarily-to fill shortages domestically or 
in which the jobs are unattractive to current residents. As such, we see that in the realm of 
external immigration, national initiatives have been confined to limited labour migration in 
the tertiary sector in either hard to fill positions requiring very high skills (information 
technology) or low-skill niches such as in the services sector (Menz, 2002:726). Instead of 
launching the much-needed labour market reforms, they have concluded bilateral labour 
contracts with most CEECs and Turkey to fill in skills shortages. 
 
In stark contrast to the EU-15 workers who are by all means encouraged to move from one 
member state to another, the situation of eastern workers are barred from enjoying their right 
to free movement. This picture quite fittingly matches Menz’s internal vs. external 
immigration divide except this time Central and Eastern European Countries’ nationals are 
treated as third-country nationals, whose migration potential is perceived as a threat.  
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2.4 Developments So Far 
 
Commission’s Report on the functioning of the transitional arrangements set out in the 2003 
Accession Treaty has been published in February 2006 with a view to the expiry of the first 
phase 2+3+2 year scheme on 30 April 20066. The report sheds light on the situation in 
member states that had chosen not to apply any restrictions. The report mentions that those 
member states were generally positive about the effects of this decision on their labour 
markets, highlighting the positive contribution made by workers from the new member states 
to their national economies. Yet, those EU-15 member states applying restrictions report that 
restrictions are instrumental in managing migration flows from CEECs. It is crucial, however, 
that it was acknowledged by all member states that the restrictions had the effect of 
encouraging EU-8 nationals to look for other ways to perform economic activity displayed in 
an increase in influx of posted workers or workers claiming to be self-employed. 
 
The Commission’s report ascertains that the statistical analysis of the national data received 
reveals that mobility flows between the EU-10 and the EU-15 are very limited and simply not 
large enough to affect the EU labour market in general. The report indicates that in the first 
quarter of 2005, the percentage of EU-10 workers compared to the working age population in 
the host country ranged from 0.001% in Portugal to 0.1% in France and the Netherlands, 1.4% 
in Austria, and 2% in Ireland.  There is also no evidence to show a direct link between the 
magnitude of mobility flows from EU-10 Member States and the transitional arrangements in 
place  
 
It is also acknowledged that substantial proportion of the work done by workers from EU-10 
is of temporary or seasonal nature. For example, 87% of the work permits issued in Austria 
were valid for less than six months. In Germany, 95% of the permits issued were of limited 
duration. Distinguishing between short-term and more permanent movement, existing survey 
studies suggest that the propensity for permanent emigration is fairly small for Czechs, Poles 
and Hungarians, while the preference for short-term migration, including cross-border 
commuting, seasonal and casual work is clearly much higher. Since such patterns of 
“incomplete migration” already existed before enlargement, it is not implausible to assume 
                                                 
6 COM (2006), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Report on the Functioning of the 
Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006) 
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that incomplete migration will continue to be the more important type of east-west labour 
flows following accession than conventional migration7.  
 
By and large, Commission’s report highlights the positive contributions of the migration 
flows on the economies of the EU-15 Member States following enlargement. It has helped to 
formalize the underground economy constituted by previously undocumented workers from 
the EU-10 and has beneficial effects such as greater compliance with legally sanctioned 
labour standards and improved social cohesion. Also, the sectoral composition of the EU15 
national workforce has not shown significant changes since enlargement showing no evidence 
of crowding out of national workers by the limited inflow of workers from EU-10 Member 
States and that EU-10 nationals have a complementary role to play (COM, 2006:14). 
Furthermore, EU-10 nationals alleviate skills bottlenecks in the EU-15 Member States and 
contribute to long-term growth through human capital accumulation.  
 
Recognizing that mobility flows are driven by factors related to supply and demand 
conditions, Commission draws attention to the fact that if anything, transitional arrangements 
will only delay labour market adjustments, with the risk of creating “biased” destination 
patterns even on a more permanent basis (COM, 2006:14).   In other words, the continued 
denial of opportunities for workers from the new Member States to work legally in most of 
the EU-15 bears the risk of fuelling more illegal work, the promotion of the black economy 
and worker exploitation. 
 
Therefore, the Commission urges member states, when preparing to notify their intentions for 
the second phase, not only to take due account of the statistical evidence but also to address 
an overall positive message to their citizens as to the prospects of free movement across the 
European Union and inform them properly about the underlying principles and real 
consequences of free movement of workers within the EU. While recalling the right of the 
Member states set forth in the 2003 Treaty of Accession to maintain restrictions under the 
transitional arrangements, the Commission recommends that the member states carefully 
consider whether the continuation of these restrictions is needed, in the light of the situation 
of their labour market and of the evidence of this report (COM, 2006:15). Furthermore, 
                                                 
7 N° 24, 3 May 2006, Enlargement, Two Years After: An Economic Evaluation, By the Bureau of European 
Policy Advisers and the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, page 7. 
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Parliament’s Report8 calls on those Member States that wish to continue transitional 
arrangements to create during the next stage the conditions to ensure that the transitional 
arrangements are not continued beyond 2009 (PARL, 2006:7). 
 
2.5 Experiences of Ireland, Sweden and the UK      
 
Up until now, I have provided findings pertaining to the general situation in the EU, however, 
it is also vital to exclusively focus on the experiences of those member states with no 
restrictions on the access to the labour market to see if they have experienced the influx of 
cheap Eastern workforce, in other words if their fears have been fulfilled. For the most part, I 
refer to the ECAS Report9 which aims to demystify worries shared by EU member states by 
factual and statistical arguments.                                    
 
Documented in detail in the ECAS report, since 1st of May, nationals of new member states 
wishing to take up employment in the United Kingdom are required to register with the 
Worker Registration System (WRS). From the WRS, the Home Office drew major 
conclusions on labour flows to the UK and provided key findings on the post-enlargement 
period, which were published in the Accession Monitoring Report. According to the Report, 
the total number of EU-8 workers registered in the UK amounts to 175, 000, where a big 
majority of the applicants (82%) were aged 18-34, predominantly male (60%), only 5% of the 
registered workers were in charge of dependants. September/October 2004 was a peak period 
for the newcomers, when the numbers reached the level of the first three post-accession 
months (ECAS, 2005:10). Still, the relatively high number of migrants constitutes only 0.4% 
of the total working population.  
 
Furthermore, the British economy gained from the presence of the extra workforce on its 
labour market: a net gain of around 500 million pounds over 12 months, while only a tiny 
percentage of migrants sought state aid. Migrant workers took up “hard-to-fill” jobs, because 
even if the UK has half a million job vacancies, at the same time it has to deal with job 
shortages. The International Property and Construction Organisation reports that Polish and 
                                                 
8 Report on the transitional arrangements restricting the free movement of workers on EU labour markets. 
(2006/2036 )INI).22.3.2006. Committee on Employment and Social Affairs. Rapporteur: Csaba Öry. 
9European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) Report on the free movement of Workers in EU-25 Who is afraid of 
EU Enlargement? Written by Julianne Traser and edited by Tony Venables, August 2005.  
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Czech electricians, plasterers, bricklayers or carpenters made up for the lack of skilled local 
workers in Britain (ECAS, 2005:11). Similarly, the influx of workers in the two sectors 
concerned, agriculture and construction, did not have the effect of increasing unemployment 
rather it had the impact of improving the profitability and competitiveness for the businesses 
concerned, raising their productivity, and strengthening their financial position (PARL, 
2006:7) hence contributing to national economy’s growth rate.  
 
It is also interesting to point out that migration has not been higher into countries with open 
borders than those with tough restrictions. Overall the Commission’s Report puts forth that 
the number of workers from the new EU members was equivalent to just 0.4 per cent of the 
UK workforce, lower than in countries such as Germany (0.7 per cent) and Austria (1.4 per 
cent) which introduced work permits.        
 
Also, in Ireland, access to labour market for the new Member State nationals was not 
restricted but it was linked to registration for work and residence permit. Ireland maintained 
its right to have recourse to the safeguard clause in case its labour market suffers serious 
disruption. Not only no such trend is observed, Ireland has benefited from enlargement with 
4.2%, it has one of lowest rates of unemployment in the EU.  
 
Ireland has been recruiting Central European workforce since 1999 due to skills and labour 
shortages, so EU-8 nationals and especially Polish and Lithuanian workers were already 
present in Ireland in large numbers prior to enlargement. When the Irish government released 
first figures on the post-enlargement migration trends in August 2004, it had already observed 
a ten fold increase in the number of work permits issued to EU-8 nationals compared to the 
first quarter of the year (ECAS,2005:12) 85, 000 registered workers make Ireland-in 
proportion- the top destination of Central European migrants (ECAS,2005:13) composed of 
40, 000 Polish, 18, 000 Lithuanians and 9, 000 Latvians with migrant workers mostly 
employed in the construction sector.           
 
Different than United Kingdom and Ireland, applying no transitional measures, opting for no 
safeguard clause and granting equal access to its welfare system for nationals of the new 
member states, Sweden is the only country amongst the EU-15 to have given full meaning to 
free movement (ECAS,2005:13).  ECAS report makes use of the residence permits issued to 
calculate the number of migrant workers, who have entered Sweden after enlargement. The 
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report of the Swedish Migration Board shows a 70% increase in the number of applications 
for residence permits from the Eastern European Area. Until the end of December 2004, 
Sweden issued a total number of 21 800 residence permits, at the same time experiencing an 
important reduction in the number of work permits issued by 13, 600 explained by the fact 
that new Member State nationals are no longer required to hold a work permit in order to take 
up employment in Sweden. And Polish nationals constituted the largest number of migrants 
followed by Lithuanians and Estonians.  
 
Contrary to other member states, enlargement was not seen as a problem by the Swedish. 
According to a Eurobarometer survey revealing public opinion in the EU-15, only 7 % of the 
population considers immigration worrying, and 25 % thinks the economic situation is the 
major concern. According to the ECAS Report, migrants did not prove to be benefit tourists 
either. In 2004, the Swedish social security system allocated only 18, 000 euros as a social 
assistance to EU-8 nationals (ECAS, 2005:14).    
 
The member states had to notify the Commission by 1st of May 2006 the latest on their 
intentions to lift or keep the restrictions. Four Member States (Finland, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal) have decided to lift restrictions for the second, three year phase of the transitional 
arrangements, while six others (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) have decided to alleviate them. Austria and Germany announced that they will 
not be changing policy now10.  Austria’s Economy Minister Martin Batrenstein has said that 
the experience of those old member states that opted to pursue a liberal approach-in particular 
that of Britain- “provides reason for caution” and that “when the door is open one cannot shut 
it”. And Germany’s Economy Minister Michael Glos arguing they can’t do without [them]11  
 
Conclusion 
 
Labour movement restrictions can be rejected as a matter of principle since free movement of 
persons is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community Law (Article 39 of the 
EC Treaty) and is also an essential element of European Citizenship. Furthermore, the 
economic rationale for maintaining restrictions on the free movement of workers after the date 
                                                 
10 www.euractiv.com updated on 13 April 2006. 
11 www.euractiv.com  
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of accession is weaker than often assumed in the popular debate. According to the 
Commission’s report on the effect of transitional arrangements, the free movement of labour 
contributed to the recipient countries’ economic and employment growth. The own-initiative 
report adopted by the European Parliament on 5 April 2006 drafted by Hungarian 
Conservative MEP Csaba Öry confirms the Commission’s findings that Britain, Ireland and 
Sweden, which have not excluded workers from the eight new member states subject to the 
2+3+2 scheme, have drawn economic benefit from their decision.  
 
In the mean time, the twelve old member states who have excluded the workers did not profit 
much by the exclusion since they created new problems and distortions on their labour 
markets such as higher levels of illegal work and “sham self-employment” as well as 
“regionally acute wage pressure”, unfair working conditions and exploitation of migrant 
workers. Furthermore, while the income gap between the new Member States and the EU-15 
is likely to diminish to some extent over the transition period, the basic incentives to migrate 
will not be fundamentally different from now. In any case, applying temporary curbs on 
labour mobility from the new Member States will only delay the overall movement of 
workers and, in the meantime, introduce “biased” destination patterns of the flows into the 
EU-15, with the risk to distort mobility even on a more permanent basis leading to 
proliferation of undocumented work, bogus “self-employed” work, and fictitious service 
provision and sub-contracting.12 Therefore, in the face of statistical and factual evidence, 
transitional arrangements seem to be put in place for domestic political consumption in the 
context of slow-moving economies, continuing high unemployment and anti-immigration 
sentiment in the EU-15 (van Selm & Tsolakis, 2004:5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 N° 24, 3 May 2006, “Enlargement, Two Years After: An Economic Evaluation”, By the Bureau of European 
Policy Advisers and the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, page 71. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TURKEY AND FREE MOVEMENT OF LABOUR 
 
17 December 2004 was a pivotal point in the history of Turkey-EU relations, when the 
European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. 
Although there are many facets of the topic, one of the most contested issues of Turkey’s 
envisaged EU membership is the prospect of Turkish immigration to the EU.  
 
Previous chapter has laid down the current situation with respect to east-west migration flow, 
the accompanying debates at the national and EU-level and the functioning of the transitional 
arrangements in practice. Drawing from the experiences of the CEECs, yet paying due 
attention to the particularities of the Turkish case, I wish to analyse the possible migration 
scenarios  emulated for Turkey with a view to formulate projections concerning the future of 
Turkey and EU relations with respect to labour mobility. 
 
3.1 Just another Enlargement?   
 
Similar to the accession process of the ten new member states, anticipation of large-scale 
migration, which evokes fear and anxiety, is associated with Turkey’s eventual membership. 
Different than the CEECs, however, proponents of the “Turkey is big yet poor” argument 
allude to the large income differential between Turkey and the EU, which signal a greater 
magnitude of migration from Turkey. The Eurostat statistics displaying data for gross 
domestic product (GDP) at market prices and purchasing power parity for Turkey and a 
selection of EU member states reveal that Turkey’s population of 70 million almost equals 
that of the ten new member states at 75 million. And it is poorer. The ten new member states 
account for 16% of EU-25 population and 4.6% of EU GDP, while Turkey’s GDP in 2002 is 
only 1.9% of that of the EU-25. Furthermore, Turkey’s GDP per head (in purchasing power 
parity terms) is slightly below that of Romania and is only 27% of the EU average (Hughes, 
2004:10). Furthermore, according to UN population forecasts, Turkey will have a population 
of 82 million by the possible accession date of 2015, almost as large as Germany. Ten years 
later in 2025, Turkey at 87 million would be the largest member of the Union constituting 
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15.5% of the EU’s population, while Germany would account for 14.3% of the total 
population (Hughes, 2004:8). 
 
Despite above findings, Turkey has a considerable growth rate- annual growth of 5% on a 
positive scenario- which should not go unnoticed. Also, Turkey is advantageous in 
demographic terms over the CEECs with its young population, making up 30% of the total 
population under the age of 15 and 20% in the 15-24 age groups (Hughes, 2004:15). Besides, 
unemployment rate of 10.6% in Turkey is only a little above the EU-25 average and below 
that in many of the new member states such as Poland, where Eurostat figures revealed an 
unemployment rate of 19.9% for the year 2002 (ibid).  
 
Before proceeding to analyse possible migration scenarios and estimates for Turkey, two 
points need further emphasis. Firstly, as is the case with the CEECs, it will be sometime 
before Turkish nationals can enjoy free movement of labour and the initiative solely rests with 
the member states of the Union, i.e. national governments. In the case of Turkey, many 
anticipate a transition period of 10 years if all goes well. As stipulated in the Negotiating 
Framework for Turkey submitted by the Commission on 29 June 2005:  
“Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses 
may be considered. The Commission will include these as appropriate, in its proposals in 
areas such as free movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the 
decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of 
persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States.”    
 
Secondly, likely migration flows from Turkey to the EU upon full membership cannot be 
predicted with any certainty since it will depend on relative income, unemployment levels and 
labour market opportunities at that time. Nonetheless, the direction of migration flows can be 
ascertained since it is commonsensical to reason that future Turkish migrants are more likely 
to follow the paths of past flows. The migration literature reveals that the destination of 
migrants primarily depends on network effects (Lejour, Mooij, Capel, 2004:35). Based on 
this, the current composition of Turkish population residing in various EU countries can 
provide insights as to where the migration flows will disperse on the EU territory.  
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Examining how future migration flows would be distributed across EU countries, a study 
conducted by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis13 (CPB) reveals that of 
the expected 2.7 million Turkish people migrating from Turkey to Europe, a large share of 
Turkish migrants will reside in Germany (76%), which will receive more than 2 million 
Turkish immigrants. France (%8) and the Netherlands (4%) also host a relatively large share 
of Turkish immigrants and will receive, respectively, 213,000 and 107,000 migrants (Lejour, 
Mooij, Capel, 2004:35). Faced with the prospect of an asymmetrical migration, Pastore 
(2005) argues that it is no coincidence that the politicians of Germany, France and Austria 
have been most vocal opponents of a rapid start in accession negotiation. By the same token, 
it is highly likely that these member states will persist on sustaining national restrictions 
regarding labour mobility for the longest period of time.    
 
3.2 Estimates of Migration Flows from Turkey to the European Union 
 
Many studies aiming to estimate the magnitude of potential migration inflows to the EU-15 
from the ten new member states have been carried out and some of the findings have been 
included in the preceding chapter. However, I would also like to mention here an updated 
study by DIW14 (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) on migratory patterns for the 
sake of comparison. This study predicts that the potential inflow from the Central and Eastern 
European Countries by 2030 will at most be 3.7 million persons in total. The inflow into the 
EU-15 on a yearly basis is estimated to be between 318,000 and 400,000 from the start of free 
movement accounting for at most 0.1 of the current EU population (Turmann & Carrera, 
2004). Assuming the determinants of Turkish migration to be similar to the east-west flow 
and adjusting the predicted Turkish population by possible accession in 2015 at 82 million 
(compared to 104 million for the CEECs) the following results are obtained: migration levels 
starting at 225, 000 and a total stock of 2.9 million, which makes about 0.5 % of the EU-28 
population of 570 million in 2025 (Hughes, 2004:17). 
 
As aforementioned in this chapter, the study carried out by the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) elaborates on the potential migration flows following the 
                                                 
13 CPB Document No.56 (2004) “Assessing the economic implications of Turkish accession to the EU” by A.M. 
Lejour, R.A de Mooij and C.H. Capel. 
14 P. Alvaraz-Plata, H. Bruecker, B. Silivertovs (2003) “Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe 
into the EU-15 – an update” Report for the European Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs. 
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accession of Turkey to the Union with a view to explore the implications for labour markets. 
The researchers adopt an approach similar to one used by De Mooij and Tang (2003) in 
carrying out studies to calculate the long-term migration potential from Central and Eastern 
European Countries to the EU. Deriving the implicit migration elasticity for the income 
differential from De Mooij and Tang and applying the figures for the Turkish population and 
the income differential between Turkey and the EU-15, this study has obtained a long-run (15 
years after accession) migration potential of 2.7 million people from Turkey. This number 
equals 4% of the current Turkish population, or another 0.7 % of current population in the 
EU-15, whereas the numbers for CEECs were 3% and 0.7% respectively (Lejour, Mooij and 
Capel, 2004). Common to both of the scenarios, the log-run migration potential of Turkish 
migrants do not even reach 1% of the current EU-15 population.  
 
Lejour, Mooij and Capel also assess the economic implications of 2.7 million Turks migrating 
after accession. Treating skill level of potential immigrants as a key determinant of economic 
impact of migration on the country of destination and country of origin, the study uses two 
simulations. In the first simulation, the researchers assume the composition of Turkish 
immigrants is equal to the composition of workers in the EU. In the second simulation, they 
assume all the Turkish immigrants are unskilled. In the first case, migration reduces overall 
GDP in Turkey by 2.2 %. In Germany and the Netherlands- the two destinations most likely 
to be preferred by migrants- GDP increases by 2.2 % and 0.6 % respectively. In the second 
simulation, there is 1.8% reduction in Turkey’s GDP. In Germany and the Netherlands, there 
will be 1.8 % and 0.5% increase respectively. The study concludes that depending on the skill 
level of migrants, this could add between 0.5-0.7 % to EU-15’s GDP (Lejour, Mooij and 
Capel, 2004:47).  
 
Finally, a study undertaken by Erzan, Kuzubaş and Yıldız15 offers a set of detailed country-
specific simulations to estimate the eventual immigration from Turkey to the EU for the 
period 2004 to 2030 in view of Turkey joining the Union and restrictions on labour mobility 
is removed. The simulation results of the study for net migration from Turkey to EU-15 in this 
period is to be between 1 and 2.1 million, when a successful accession period with high 
growth and free labour mobility starting at 2015 – a rather optimistic assumption to explore 
the upper bound of the immigration potential as indicated by the authors- is envisaged. On the 
                                                 
15  This study has been presented at the conference “Immigration issues in EU-Turkish Relations: Determinants 
of Immigration and Integration” held at Boğaziçi Un
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other hand, if Turkey’s membership process is endangered and high growth cannot be 
sustained; 2.7 million people may be penetrating the EU-15 despite the prevailing strict 
restrictions on labour mobility.  
 
The estimation method used by Bruecker, Alvarez-Plata and Siliverstovs (2003)16 to estimate 
potential migration from the CEECs has been widely employed by researchers to formulate 
projections on the free movement of workers with respect to Turkey. And this study is no 
exception. The scenarios are based on data drawn from three sets of reference groups and 
within each of these three sets, two sub-scenarios are elaborated. Concerning the first two 
reference groups, the two scenarios are whether free movement within Europe would be 
realised or not by the year 2015 and for the third reference group, whether Turkey would be 
experiencing high or low growth based on membership prospect.   
 
When the free labour mobility experience of the EU countries for the period 1967-2001 was 
taken as the reference group, total net migration barely reached 1.1 million by 2030. And 
when the researchers relied on the guest-worker scenario, i.e. free movement is not realised, 
the total immigration projection to EU-15 from Turkey amounted to 1.8 million- a noticeable 
jump is observed from 1.1 million, however not a drastic one since socio-economic 
achievements likely to be experienced during pre-accession is neglected. 
 
The experience of southern “cohesion” countries Spain, Portugal and Greece was taken as the 
second reference group (again for the period of 1967-2001) - which displayed similar 
characteristics as Turkey at the time of their accession. In the scenario of free labour mobility 
experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain emulated for Turkey, total net migration forecast 
until 2030 did not exceed 1 million. However, in the guest-worker scenario, the number 
approached 2 million, almost doubling the actual membership experience of these countries.  
 
Lastly, when Turkey’s own emigration record was taken as the reference group, total net 
migration reached 2.1 million in the first simulation of free movement of labour and high 
growth. The second simulation shows what is likely to happen if the EU anchor is lost. In case 
of a suspension in Turkey’s accession process, a fall in income growth and deterioration in the 
labour market will follow, thereby leading to an increase in migration flows from Turkey. In 
                                                 
16 P. Alvaraz-Plata, H. Bruecker, B. Silivertovs (2003) “Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe 
into the EU-15 – an update” Report for the European Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs. 
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this highly pessimistic scenario, the forecast for total net migration until 2030 exceeded 2.7 
million. This finding is particularly worthy of attention since it underscores that “if Turkey 
loses the EU membership perspective, EU may end up having more immigrants from Turkey 
despite closed borders and strict visa regulations” (Erzan, Kuzubaş, Yıldız, 2004:12).  
 
In this respect, the study argues that the EU cannot exercise a zero immigration policy since 
currently there is already an annual net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 of 35,000 people. 
And in the event of a slowdown or suspension in Turkey’s accession process, lower growth 
and an increase in unemployment coupled with political uncertainty will lead to significant 
increase in the number of migrants exacerbating the situation for the EU. Also, as the 
experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain substantiate, a successful accession period, one 
which helps to improve the economic and political situation at home, reduces the incentive to 
migrate, hence curbing migration outflows. And “there is no a priori reason why Turkey 
would not go through a similar experience.” (Erzan, Kuzubaş,Yıldız, 2004:14).    
 
3.3 Demographic Complementarity between the EU and Turkey? 
 
Turkey has a young population and the population growth rate has been steadily decreasing. 
The ratio of young adults to the total population is currently 65 percent and this ratio will 
approach 70 percent in 2025 before starting to decline- a phenomenon called “the population 
window of opportunity” (Erzan & Kirişçi, 2004:63). However, this demographic 
phenomenon, which is an important catalyst for economic growth, cannot be sustained 
forever. The estimations for Turkey envisage another 20 or 25 years before the rate of growth 
of the adult population rapidly drops and the older section of the non-active population begins 
to replace its younger segment. The relative weight of the Turkish population aged between 
15-64 will increase from 64.1 % in 2000 to 66.9 % in 2030 and slowly decline thereafter to 
reach 63.6 % of the total population in 2050 due to an increase in the share of the elderly 
population (Behar, 2006:20) Also, according to UN projections on fertility rates, post-2015 
Turkish fertility levels are expected to fall to 1.85, which is close to current European fertility 
levels and the Turkish population may even begin to decline after having reached a peak of 95 
to 100 million in about three of four decades from now (ibid).  
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Behar (2006:23) contends the Turkish population will experience an ageing process at a speed 
that is unprecedented in the region and that in about 25 years from now, Turkey will not have 
a “young” population. The share of the elderly population in the whole population will 
increase from 5.8 % in 2000 to 9.5 in 2025 and 17.9 % in 2050, the number of those aged 65 
and above amounting to 17 million. However, currently Turkey qualifies as having a young 
population and   by the time Turkey is to confront a new demographic state, it is of utmost 
importance to exploit “window of opportunity” to the optimum. The relatively high weight of 
the Turkish population aged between 15-64, which makes up the active labour force, is an 
important advantage Turkey has over the new and old EU members.  
 
The aging population of Europe and the eventual decline it is likely to bring in the European 
populations has recently received due attention although “European demographers have 
sounded warning bells for at least the last 30 years” (Behar, 2006:24). The population of the 
EU-15 is expected to fall to 367 millions by 2025 and further down to 331 millions by 2050, 
which equivalent to the population of the seven smallest States of the EU-15, i.e. Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. Furthermore, the population 
of the 10 new member states apart from Slovakia is also on decline, with a particularly 
dramatic demographic outlook in the Baltics (Pastore, 2005:3).  
 
When such is the situation in Europe, Turkey with its robust demographic outlook and 
growing population is expected to grow by 43%, up to 98 millions by the mid- century and is 
looked upon to bring demographic stability to Europe. Some authors like Pastore believe that 
“from a purely arithmetic point of view, the scenario is more of a sort of demographic 
complementarity, rather than incompatibility and if the aim were demographic stability of the 
continent as a whole, an increase of human mobility from Turkey to the rest of Europe would 
rather be a blessing than a threat” (Pastore, 2005:3).  
 
However, demographers examining the impact of migration as a counterbalance to ageing 
express the view that migration cannot provide an effective remedy to the aging Europe. That 
is unless the migration flows are of a very large magnitude, on the scale of millions annually, 
which is then socially and politically unsustainable. Behar, for instance, argues:  
“Frequently voiced thesis of a necessary complementarity between the population of Turkey 
and the demographic structures of the countries of the European Union is totally devoid of 
any solid demographic foundation. The idea of demographic complementarity between a 
 46 
 
“young” Turkey and an “older” Europe is either the product of wishful thinking (on the 
Turkish side), or of an irrational fear of a massive and uncontrollable immigration and of its 
effects on the labour market and employment (on the European side)…” (Behar, 2006:25).  
 
Studies reveal that close to one million (949,000) net yearly migrants appear to be necessary 
from 2005 to the year 2050, in order to prevent the European population from decreasing 
further. Even more strikingly, to keep the size of the 15-64 age group constant, net migration 
to Europe would have to reach a yearly figure of 1.5888 million throughout the 2000-2050 
period and Germany and Italy alone would need about half that figure to keep their adult 
population from decreasing (Behar, 2006:27). Thus, whatever volume of migration is foreseen 
from Turkey to the EU, the demographic studies have rendered argument favouring 
replacement migration futile on the grounds that “migration in itself will never offset ageing” 
(ibid).   
 
That being said, another aspect of the demographic deficit in Europe needs to be highlighted.   
Due to aging populations and low fertility rates, the ratio of working age people to the whole 
of the population will decline and the EU will soon have to tackle labour shortages. 
Projections show that, by the year 2050, and unless there is an unexpected rise in fertility, i.e. 
another period of baby boom is experienced, Europe will have a smaller total labour force 
than in 1950 (Behar, 2006:27). Germany, especially, will be seriously affected by ageing 
populations. The population aged 60 or over as a proportion of the population of working age, 
the so-called old-age dependency ratio, is expected to rise to 77 percent by 2050 and the 
labour supply will decrease by an average of 0.7 % per year between 2010 and 2040 
(Boswell, Chou, Smith, 2005:8). 
 
As European policy makers respond to this development by raising the retirement age and 
trying to stimulate labour force participation among the populace at large, and the women and 
the elderly in particular, having recourse to controlled migration emerges as an indispensable 
option. The example of countries such as Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom admitting 
increasing numbers of migrant workers to fill in labour shortages in agriculture, health, and 
services is commonly cited. Experts believe these trends are likely to accelerate in the future 
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and that migration is one of the components of a policy mix necessary to maintain Europe’s 
economic productivity and competitiveness17.  
 
The study conducted by Krieger and Maitre (2006) aims to unearth the expected volume of 
migration and the structure of potential migrants from the ten new member states plus 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey into the old member states. The results reveal that the highest 
general intention to migrate is shown in Turkey, with 6.2 percent and in Bulgaria and 
Romania with 5 percent whilst the citizens of the ten new member states are less likely to 
move at 3.1 percent. However, with respect to firm intention to migrate, only 0.3 percent of 
the Turkish population have a firm intention to migrate over the next five years. It is striking 
that there is a high level of discrepancy between the general and firm intention to move for 
Turkish migrants over five years under the condition of free mobility. Assuming a Turkish 
population stock of all inhabitants of 15 years and older of nearly 48.9 million in 2003, these 
figures would correspond to 3.03 million for the general intention and 0.15 million for the 
firm intention. Furthermore, when a third indicator -basic intention to migrate- is employed, 
one would predict a minimum migration potential of around 400,000 Turkish citizens over 
five years in the EU-15 (Krieger and Maitre, 2006:49).  
 
The study also delves into the socio-economic characteristics of those respondents that 
express willingness to migrate. The particular migration pattern of Turkey in comparison to 
the other country groupings displays the following: Potential Turkish migrants have a stronger 
rural background, are more often in the lowest income quartile and have a relatively high 
mobility rate within the unemployed. On one hand, examining the results, the authors 
conclude that the “combination of all three dimensions indicates additional challenging 
problems of labour market integration in the receiving countries.” (Krieger and Maitre, 
2006:59). On the other hand, the Turkish migrants represent the relatively highest proportion 
of migrants holding a university degree and a significant proportion of migrants who are still 
studying and this part of the Turkish migration is likely to contribute to EU’s labour markets 
(ibid). 
 
It is also important to point out that the demand for labour in the European markets is not the 
same as in the 1960s when unskilled Turkish workers migrated to Germany and other 
                                                 
17 Interview with ILO Online with Patrick Taran from the ILO International Migration Branch, Managing labour 
migration: Turkey and the European Union. 
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European countries. While the demographic factors primarily influence the labour supply, 
economic trends also give shape to the composition of demand for labour. In particular, 
structural change and the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy will generate 
greater demand for a qualified workforce (Boswell, Chou, Smith, 2005:9) Bearing that in 
mind and devising a coherent employment policy, Turkey needs to train its young workforce 
for high-tech jobs to make use of the opportunities in the EU labour market that are likely to 
arise upon accession.         
3.4 Anti-immigrant sentiment 
 
The post- war Turkish migration to Europe began with the guest-workers within the 
framework of the “guest-worker program” to fill low-skilled labour shortages in the war-torn 
economies of Europe. Turkey signed bilateral agreements with first the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1961, followed by the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria in 1964; France in 1965 
and Sweden in 1967. Currently, there are about 3.8 million Turkish immigrants residing in EU 
countries and some 1.3 million Turkish immigrants have acquired citizenship of their country 
of residence (Parker & Austin, 2005:32). Turkish “guest workers” have contributed 
significantly to the economies of their host countries. According to the results of one study, 
1.2 million Turks, who comprise 0.75 percent of the total working population in the EU 
countries, have contributed 107.8 billion DM or 55.1 billion Euros to the GDP of the EU from 
1998 onwards. For comparison, this amounts to twice the annual GNP of Luxembourg and 51 
percent of Greece’s GDP (Parker & Austin, 2005:33).  The Turkish population in the EU has 
an economic power 16 times that of Malta, 10 times that of Estonia and eight times that of 
Lithuania (Crossick, 2004:80).            
 
The economic contribution of Turkish migrants to the war-torn economies of Europe is often 
neglected and the overriding fears among Europeans towards an influx of Turkish immigrants 
is justified on the grounds of perceived failed integration of Turkish migrants into their host 
societies. This reinforces anti-immigrant sentiments and aggravates anxiety among the 
European public towards further immigration. The majority of those tend to bring up the 
issues of high levels of unemployment, low levels of educational attainment, abuses of the 
welfare system and the formation ethnic and religious enclaves as an explanation. 
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Against this background, in the absence of a European “ideology” of migration, national 
practices with respect to migration and integration strategies towards immigrants diverge 
considerably. However, unequivocally it is those countries that have experienced post-war 
Turkish migration and host a significantly large population of Turkish community, which are 
most critical about Turkey’s EU membership and free movement of Turkish workers. One 
study by AGF18 provides evidence of divergence in patterns of anti-immigrant sentiment in 
the UK and Germany, where public concerns have centred primarily on asylum and irregular 
migration in the former and labour migration in the latter. The study pinpoints the following:   
 
“In the UK, the established patterns of political mobilisation suggest that arguments about 
welfare abuse and control problems will continue to predominate over concerns about cultural 
diversity or competition for jobs. In Germany, by contrast, the experience of the unintended 
consequences of temporary labour migration in the post-war period has made the public more 
cautious about accepting the economic case for labour migration. And anti-immigrant 
sentiment is frequently channelled into concerns about the socio-cultural impact of diversity. 
This type of identity-based concern combined with scepticism as to the economic benefits of 
labour migration, has led to greater resistance to labour migration in Germany” (Boswell, 
Chou, Smith, 2005:44).         
 
The comparative studies evaluating the effectiveness of different integration policies pursued 
by member states cannot praise one integration strategy over another since each one has its 
own strengths and weaknesses resulting in different outcomes.19   An effective strategy for 
soothing public concerns about integration should be to clearly distinguish between part and 
current recruitment strategies. It is not only the perceived failed integration of Turkish 
immigrants but also the failed immigration policies of the Member States. The lesson from the 
post-war Turkish migration should not be that labour migration will inevitably create 
integration problems. Rather, the lesson to draw from this experience is that “a large influx of 
low-skilled labour, combined with the absence of effective integration policies, may produce 
a range of unintended socioeconomic and cultural repercussions for receiving societies” 
(Boswell, Chou, Smith, 2005:47).          
                                                 
18 Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, “Reconciling demand for labour migration 
with public concerns about immigration: Germany and the UK” by Christina Boswell, Meng-Hsuan Chou and 
Julie Smith, August 2005.  
19 See for example Doomernik, Jeroen, 1998, “The Effectiveness of Integration Policies towards Immigrants and 
their descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands”, International Migration Papers, Geneva:ILO. 
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Moreover, the identity of the Turkish population in Europe is increasingly cast in terms of 
religion and resentment toward Turkish immigrants has intensified following 9/11 and 
terrorist bombings in London and Madrid. There is evidence of widespread ‘Islamophobia’ in 
Europe after September 11 (Phalet & ter Wal, 2004). Viewing Muslims in negative terms and 
prejudices have become rife among the European public. Media and political discourse  
contribute to this environment by presenting all Muslims as fundamentalists and thus as 
potential terrorists posing a threat to internal security of the state in question, which reinforce 
the experienced negative feelings towards the Other and put Turkish immigrants under great 
pressure.  
 
Also, there are those who question the compatibility of Islam with their basic modern, 
democratic Western values and view Turkey’s accession as “a bridgehead from which large 
numbers of Muslims will “invade” Western society.” (Crossick, 2004:79). In the 
securitisation of migration discourse, central to this fear of swamped by waves of immigrants 
with different cultural lifestyles lies the perceived threat to cultural homogeneity of the 
receiving states, which is an indispensable part of the nation-state heritage. By presenting the 
cultural and religious differences of the migrant communities as the reason of their failure of 
integration to the society at large, both in social and political terms, constitutes an important 
source for mobilizing security rhetoric. The different lifestyle and the culture of the (non-
integrated) migrants are then displayed as potentially destabilising the social formation 
(Huysmans, 2000:765). 
 
The results of a pioneering study by Kaya and Kentel (2005) on the Euro-Turks living in 
France and Germany reveals three major groups of Euro-Turks. The first group of the 
‘bridging groups’ makes up slightly more than 40% of the respondents, who are concurrently 
affiliated with the home and host countries; the second group of ‘breaching groups’ make up 
approximately 40 % of the total respondents, those who still have a strong orientation to the 
homeland, including such extreme religious, nationalist and laicist persons. The third group, 
comprising those who have ‘assimilated’ into the host societies, accounts for around 20% of 
the total respondents. 
 
The research acknowledges that the majority of Euro-Turks have become politically, socially, 
economically and culturally integrated and active agents in their countries of settlement. 
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Around 20% have actually assimilated into the receiving society and 40% have generated a 
way of life embracing both the homeland and the host-land in a manner that forms a bridge 
between the two (Kaya & Kentel, 2005:69). Western European states tend to regard Islam as a 
threat to their national security, yet the research shows that orientation towards Islam among 
the Euro-Turks could also be regarded as a quest for justice and fairness, the research 
proposes that the “EU states set aside the security discourse and become engaged in a justice 
discourse in their responses to minority claims” (ibid). The research concludes that Euro-
Turks fall into the category of ‘unity in diversity’ where there is a meta-European identity 
construction rather than fitting the ‘unity over diversity’ approach that reproduces cultural, 
political and national boundaries and that is opposed to the potential of the European project.       
3.5 Enlargement Fatigue in Europe and Accession of Turkey 
 
Since the spring of 2005, following the referenda in France and the Netherlands, there are 
heated debates on the drawbacks of enlargement. Senior politicians across Europe are calling 
for a slow-down, freeze or even a permanent halt to enlargement. In that sense, some argue 
that there is fear and anxiety about migration in general, but those fears are channelled in 
public debate into the issue of Turkey’s accession (Parker, 2004:21) In France, for example, 
the political opposition to Turkey’s membership of the European Union has been voiced by 
French leaders. The first move came from former French President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, 
also President of the EU Constitutional Convention, who said that Turkey’s accession to the 
EU would be ‘the end of Europe’. Excluding Turkey as a non- European country, he called 
those who have pushed for Turkey’s accession the ‘enemies’ of the European Union. Also, 
President Jacques Chirac, during the campaign for the French referendum on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005, endorsed calls for France to hold a referendum on whether 
Turkey should enter the European Union while the question of a new member has never been 
put to referendum in other EU member states (Parker, 2004:21).  
 
However, a Eurobarometer survey in June 2005 suggested that as little as six percent of the 
‘NO’ votes in the Constitutional referendum were opposed to Turkish accession. In the 
Netherlands, the corresponding figure was three percent (Parker, 2004:23). Yet, in another 
Eurobarometer survey in France released in September 2005, only 20 percent of those 
surveyed who said they were opposed to the Constitution identified Turkey’s EU accession as 
the reason. In the same poll, while 67 percent of those asked listed unemployment as among 
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the most important problems facing the country, only 11 percent also gave immigration as a 
serious problem (ibid). As for the situation in the Netherlands, according to Eurobarometer 
polls from autumn 2005, a majority of 55 percent of the Dutch population is opposed to 
Turkish accession, although the 41 percent in favour is also high, ranking 4th among EU 
members20.Another finding from the same Eurobarometer survey shows that that support for 
enlargement in France (32 for, 58 % against) is broadly less than the average in the EU-25 
member states (50 % for, 38 % against, 12 % undecided); only the German figures (33 % for, 
61 % against) and those for Austria (31 % for, 58 % against) show a stronger opposition 
(Parker, 2005:24) which points in the direction of “enlargement fatigue” of the EU-15 
members.  
 
The other country where the referendum for European Constitution resulted in ‘NO’ votes is 
the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands has been welcoming immigrants hospitably for 
centuries, the change in public and political discourse is manifest since the turn of the 
century.21There is growing resistance among the public towards failing integration of 
immigrants not just socio-economically but also culturally, which has been mobilised by 
right-wing populist parties personified by Pim Fortuyn. Furthermore, domestic and 
international events like the murder of Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by a 
”Muslim immigrant” and September 11 attacks, Madrid and London bombings have 
contributed to anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia.  
 
Nonetheless, it was under the Dutch presidency in December 2004 that the EU agreed to open 
accession talks with Turkey. Notwithstanding the polls, Dutch politicians in both government 
and opposition have endorsed a ‘strict but fair’ approach envisaging further enlargement 
based on merit and to that end conveying the message to the electorate that Turkey can 
become a member once she fulfils the Copenhagen criteria. And the politicians have by and 
large rejected arguments based on religious or cultural identity. The study carried out by ESI 
suggests that the “language of Dutch politicians, however guarded, is not the language of 
enlargement fatigue. Dutch politicians from all the major parties have been willing to lead the 
debate, rather than blindly following opinion polls”. This bears hope for other member states 
                                                 
20  Beyond Enlargement Fatigue? The Dutch Debate on Turkish Accession (2006)  www.esiweb.org 
21 For a detailed account, see Prins, Baukje and Boris Slijper. 2002. “Multicultural Society under Attack 
Introduction”.Journal of International Migration and Integration  3 &4 Summer/Fall: 370-377. 
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to follow suit in starting informed debates with a view to influence European public opinion 
on migration.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Migration has become a salient issue in the contemporary world due to both quantitative and 
qualitative evolution of international migration. More importantly, since the late1980s with 
the demise of the bipolar world, international migration has begun to be perceived as a 
security issue and international migration has been identified as a non-traditional security 
threat among many others. Parallel to the changes experienced at the international system and 
the changing paradigms, security cannot be confined to the defence of the territory from 
external or internal enemies anymore, but rather economic and social well-being of the 
society along with national identity emerged as values to be preserved and protected from the 
threats posed by migration. Furthermore, increasing global interconnectedness combined with 
post-9/11 security concerns has rendered free movement of people even more politically 
sensitive.  
 
Securitisation is the practice whereby an issue becomes a security one, not necessarily 
because of the nature or the objective importance of the threat, but because the issue is 
presented as such. In this respect, immigration is not a threat in itself but through the process 
of securitisation of migration, it becomes a threat for the way it is perceived by Western 
societies, i.e. invasion of national/European identity, competition over jobs etc. The interplay 
of different actors like the media, political elite and public produce immigration as a security 
concern in the Member States of the European Union with the aim of preserving existing 
power structures and socio-political boundaries.  
 
Furthermore, migration has become a meta-issue, one which can be referred to as the cause of 
many problems experienced by the populace, which seems to offer an ‘explanation’ and a 
‘justification’ for the experienced negative feelings towards the Other, namely immigrants. 
This implies that the causes of anti-immigrant sentiment is located in the impact of migration 
on employment, welfare and social services, criminality, and other social and economic costs, 
which generate concerns on the part of host societies. Conversely, anti-immigrant sentiment 
can flourish as a function of other sorts of anxieties generated by socio-economic or political 
changes, which have little to do with immigration per se. And these insecurities are often 
channelled into public concerns about immigration.  
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Recent discussions on migration issues in Europe have been fuelled firstly, by the 
enlargement of the EU in May 2004 by ten new member states from Central and Eastern 
countries, Malta and Cyprus and the possible migration flows by Turkey’s accession. For 
politicians and for a significant part of the electorate in the EU-15, the major concern is an 
expected “influx” of workers from the new member states and Turkey based on economic and 
opportunity differentials between new and old member states and even more with the 
candidate country Turkey. Concerns cover a wide range of issues, which are related to a 
further increase in already high levels of unemployment in old member states, fears raised in 
regard to a possible abuse of the existing non-contributory social welfare provisions, namely 
the “welfare tourism”, negative effects on social cohesion and “societal security”.  
 
Based on concerns in the old Member States, the European Commission in its accession 
agreements with eight of the ten new Member States -with the exception of Malta and Cyprus 
where the general rules of free movement apply- established a transitional mobility regime 
potentially restricting access to EU-15 labour markets Only the UK, Ireland and Sweden 
chose not to impose any restrictions for the newcomers.  
 
Labour movement restrictions can be rejected as a matter of principle since free movement of 
persons is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community Law (Article 39 of the 
EC Treaty) and is also an essential element of European Citizenship. Furthermore, numerous 
studies conducted in this field reveal that the economic rationale for maintaining restrictions 
on the free movement of workers after the date of accession is weaker than often assumed in 
the popular debate. According to the reports published by the European Commission and the 
Parliament on the effect of transitional arrangements, Britain, Ireland and Sweden, which 
have not excluded workers from the eight new member states subject to the 2+3+2 scheme, 
have drawn economic benefit from their decision. And the twelve old member states applying 
restrictions did not profit much by the exclusion since they created new problems and 
distortions on their labour markets such as higher levels of illegal work and “sham self-
employment” as well as “regionally acute wage pressure”, unfair working conditions and 
exploitation of migrant workers.  Hence, in the face of statistical and factual evidence, 
transitional arrangements imposed on the CEECs seem to be put in place for domestic 
political consumption in the context of slow-moving economies, continuing high 
unemployment and anti-immigration sentiment in the EU-15. 
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When it comes to Turkey’s possible accession, the situation is even more contentious and the 
fear of “tidal wave of migrants” becomes more pronounced towards “tidal wave of Turkish 
immigrants”. In the experience of the CEECs, the feared large-scale east-west migration 
revolved around mainly on socio-economic costs of migration- concerns about competition 
for jobs and welfare burden were most frequently cited- as illustrated by the phrase ‘Polish 
plumber’. Unlike the CEECs, the prospect of Turkish accession and labour mobility is 
associated with the perceived failing integration of Turkish migrants socially, economically 
and culturally, which complicates the picture even more. 
 
Moreover, following September 11 attacks, Madrid and London bombings, Islamophobia has 
become widespread in Europe and prejudices and stereotypes targeting Muslim immigrants 
have proliferated. Increasingly framed in security discourse, there is tendency to view all 
Muslims as fundamentalists and as potential terrorists. Hence, although there is plenty of 
statistical and factual evidence pertaining to Turkish migration after possible accession, which 
reveal an “influx” of Turkish workers will not be happening, these are far from reassuring the 
European public. 
 
Rising inter-ethnic and -religious hostility also jeopardizes the future of Europe. The success 
of the European Union and the future of Europe are closely related to neither assimilation nor 
exclusion but successful integration of the Muslim immigrants into the European societies. 
And more important than facts and numbers, which have little influence on the prevailing 
anti-immigrant sentiment among the European public, concerted efforts of the Commission 
and member states are vital to pursue intense and informative debates on migration targeting 
public opinion; never forgetting that European project is about ‘uniting people, and not only 
the economies’.  
 
Lastly, although the EU has fallen short of devising a balanced and comprehensive 
immigration policy mainly due to member states’ reluctance to relax their firm grip on 
politically charged sensitive issues like migration, in order to establish an area of freedom, 
security and justice in its true meaning and to tackle European social fears and insecurities 
with respect to migration, EU needs to place main emphasis on securing rights rather than 
security. 
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In this study, it is argued that instead of pinpointing immigration as one of the greatest 
security concerns of the 21st century, it is vital to acknowledge the mechanism and dynamics 
that produce immigration as a security concern. The mass media is a powerful actor, in this 
sense, for not only it reflects public fears about immigration through extensive coverage, 
portraying immigrants in negative terms, but the media messages channel and strengthen 
them and transform them into a powerful message/discourse for authorities. Viewing 
securitisation of migration as a social construct, further research can explore in depth how 
different actors interact to generate mixed results of discourses and practises in a particular 
cultural, socio-economic and political context and provide insights with respect to how to de-
securitise migration.  
 
Also, I have tried to outline the historical evolution of EU immigration policies demarcating 
the lines of development of a European immigration policy: The first phase (1985-1991) 
corresponded to informal cooperation among member states and the second phase (1992-
1998) was characterized by intergovernmentalism, where national governments were still the 
primary actors although migration-related issues were regarded as common interest and 
institutional links with the other Community institutions were established. And the third 
phase, which began with entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) provides for the 
establishment of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and signifies 
“communitarization” of immigration. The scope of this study was confined to the 
development of EU immigration policies in broad terms and free movement of workers with 
respect to ten new member states and Turkey. Further studies assessing issues of border 
controls and visa regimes particularly in the context of Turkey’s accession into the Union and 
Turkey in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice would contribute considerably to this 
field. 
 
Finally, immigration policies are concerned with the regulation of international migration and 
immigrant policies focus on measures designed to integrate immigrant newcomers into their 
new societies. Although the two are distinct, they are closely linked. And EU measures have 
tended to focus on immigration rather than immigrant policies. ‘Securitisation of migration’ is 
one topic, which rests upon the blurring of the lines between internal and external security. 
Therefore, research bringing immigrant and immigration policies together in an analytical 
framework with particular emphasis on migrants’ rights in an enlarged Europe is highly 
needed to fill the lacunae in this field. 
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